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Abstract
We analyze educational institutions’ incentives to set up demanding or lax curricula in
duopolistic markets for education with endogenous enrolment of students. We assume that
there is a positive externality of student achievement on the local economy. Comparing
the case of regulated tuition fees with an unregulated market, we identify the following
ineﬃciencies: Under regulated tuition fees schools will set up ineﬃciently lax curricula in
an attempt to please low-quality students even if schools internalize some of the externality.
On the other hand, unregulated schools set up excessively diﬀerentiated curricula in order
to relax competition in tuition fees. Deregulation gets more attractive if a larger fraction of
the externality is internalized.
Keywords: Education, Local Externalities, Product Diﬀerentiation, Price Competition,
Vouchers
1. Introduction
Schools and universities provide signiﬁcant inputs to local and regional economies. How-
ever, some of these beneﬁts of education are externalities: Aggregate student achievement
spills over into the productivity of the entire local economy through various channels such
as human capital spillovers (Rauch (1993), Rosenthal and Strange (2008), Andersson et al.
(2009)), facilitating education of others (Benabou (1993)) or reducing crime (Machin et al.
(2011)). Hence, student achievement produced by educational institutions is a local public
good.
At the same time, student achievement produced by an educational institution has an
impact on its competitive position in the market for education. These strategic considerations
are unlikely to be perfectly aligned with social beneﬁts from student achievement. Hence,
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in education. People are, for instance, concerned that unregulated proﬁt maximization of
universities might lead to under-provision or ineﬃcient allocation of quality and quantity due
to imperfect competition, externalities or imperfections in the market for funds.1 A diﬀerent
concern repeatedly raised in the public discussion is that a market based university system
may induce universities to be excessively slack on study requirements due to competition for
paying students.2 This paper’s aim is to provide a ﬁrst study on educational institutions’
incentives to set up demanding or lax curricula under two diﬀerent market regimes: an
unregulated market in which educational institutions compete in tuition fees and curricula,
and a market in which tuition fees are regulated to a ﬁxed level, so that competition takes
place only in curricula.
Our analysis is driven by an assumption which we believe is the distinctive feature of the
choice of curriculum as opposed to, for instance, the choice of teaching quality: that a more
demanding curriculum is more productivity enhancing but more costly to students than a
less demanding one and, assuming that students have diﬀerent abilities, a higher ability
reduces a student’s marginal cost of preparing the exam of a more demanding curriculum.
Hence, low-ability students will prefer lax over demanding curricula even if tuition fees are
identical.
When dealing with the aforementioned externality of student achievement, we will allow
for the possibility that educational institutions directly take it into account to some extent:
Curricula of primary and secondary schools are in many countries at least inﬂuenced by
local school boards and will thus internalize local externalities such as reduced crime rates.
On the other hand, even private universities may care somewhat about the human capital
spillover to the local population, as they recruit much of their student body from the local
economy.3 We will label the total externality of student achievement social teaching spillover
and the part of it that is internalized by schools private teaching spillover.
Contradicting the conjectures made by some media, we ﬁnd that in an unregulated market
some schools and universities will set up even ineﬃciently tough curricula in order to relax
subsequent competition in tuition fees. In contrast, it is regulated tuition fees which tend
to induce all institutions to be excessively lax on students. Intuitively, the equilibrium
curriculum in the latter regime must necessarily be located ’at the median student’ among all
enrolled students, as otherwise unilateral slight underbidding or overbidding would give the
deviating institution more than half of total demand and thus increase its proﬁt, whereas this
slight deviation leaves the deviating institution’s private teaching spillover roughly constant.
Hence, in equilibrium even the private teaching spillover is not taken into account at all. In
other words, the teaching spillover works like a positive externality, so that the equilibrium
curriculum will be too lax, and this would be true even if all of the spillover was taken into
1Some of these issues have been taken up by theoretical economic research, e.g. Epple and Romano (1998,
2008), Hoxby (1999), Del Rey (2001), Kemnitz (2007).
2The Economist (1998, Sep 18th).
3See, for instance, Jepsen and Montgomery (2009)
2account in schools’ objective functions. On the other hand, equilibrium curricula do depend
on the private beneﬁt. Hence, the unregulated market will be more attractive the larger the
fraction of the private teaching spillover in social spillover.
Most assumptions we make in our model are standard in the literature on product dif-
ferentiation. Technically speaking, preferences in our model combine aspects of vertical
and horizontal diﬀerentiation, the diﬀerence between which is that consumers of a verti-
cally diﬀerentiated good agree that higher quality is better but disagree with respect to
their willingness to pay for quality,4 whereas in the case of horizontal diﬀerentiation con-
sumers bear preference costs whenever the good diﬀers from their preferred variety in any
direction.5 In particular, our result of excessively tough curricula in the unregulated case
corresponds to standard results in the literature on vertical diﬀerentiation. On the other
hand, the possibility of proﬁtably underbidding a rival’s curriculum, which is a main driv-
ing force of the ineﬃciency associated with regulated tuition fees, crucially depends on the
horizontal-diﬀerentiation aspect of our model.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the ﬁrst to analyze incentives for educational
institutions to set up demanding or lax curricula. There is a line of literature on educational
institutions competing in quality and tuition fees.6 The main diﬀerences between the choices
of quality and curricula are that (i) for arguments based on quality a model of purely vertical
diﬀerentiation would be appropriate, and (ii) the practical discussion on quality is always
closely related to cost arguments, whereas in our argument making exams harder to pass does
not necessarily involve higher costs for schools. Epple and Romano (1998) and Epple et al.
(2002) analyze competition between schools with diﬀerent objectives, public and private
schools, and ﬁnd that private schools skim oﬀ the wealthiest and most able students, an
eﬀect which is more pronounced in a system of universal vouchers. By contrast, Epple
and Romano (2008) show that this negative side eﬀect of competition can be mitigated by
appropriate design of the voucher system. While these papers focus mainly on distributional
considerations, Hoxby (1999) shows that competition among school districts increases the
eﬃciency of the use of public funds in education.
The models most closely related to ours are Del Rey (2001) and Kemnitz (2007), who
also analyze the market for education within a framework of spatial competition. Del Rey
(2001) analyzes universities’ choices to devote funds to teaching or research in a model
which is institutionally similar to our regulated case: There is non-price competition between
universities, and the budget allocated to universities by the government depends (in part)
on the number of students. Unlike in our model, however, universities are horizontally
diﬀerentiated in a dimension which is unrelated to education. Quality then takes on the
role of the price in the standard Hotelling model. We take up a diﬀerent dimension of an
educational institution’s strategy space, the choice of curriculum, and seek to assess welfare
4See for instance Shaked and Sutton (1982).
5An example is the model by Hotelling (1929).
6However, quality improvements which are eﬀective in enhancing student achievement may be diﬃcult to
ﬁnd in practice. For instance, Buddin and Zamarro (2009) show that there are large diﬀerences in student
achievement across teachers, but they cannot be pinned down to traditional measures of teacher quality.
3implications of our results, especially in comparison to the case of price competition. In this
respect, our work can be seen as complementary to Del Rey (2001).
Kemnitz (2007) analyzes universities’ quality incentives within a standard model of verti-
cal diﬀerentiation. Under the assumption of a ﬁxed total number of students in the economy,
he shows that the optimal uniform-fee regulation always outperforms the unregulated mar-
ket outcome. The main reason for this result is that students agree that higher quality
is always better, so that under regulated tuition fees universities will outbid each other in
quality until the marginal cost of doing so is equal to the tuition fee (or until the maximum
quality is reached). Consequently, the equilibrium in that model is the eﬃcient outcome
among all symmetric outcomes. This result is dramatically diﬀerent to our Proposition 3:
In our model there are always some students who would prefer a less demanding curriculum.
Hence, a school/university oﬀering a tough curriculum exposes itself to the risk of being
slightly undercut and end up with less than half of total demand. This diﬀerence is the main
reason why our conclusions are over all much less in favor of regulated tuition fees than in
the preceding literature.
Other theoretical work on optimal policies for universities to attract students has mainly
focused on peer-group eﬀects inducing universities to go after especially the high-ability
students. In Rothschild and White (1995) and Caucutt (2002), this leads to price discrimi-
nation, whereas De Fraja and Iossa (2002) analyze competition through admission standards.
Gary-Bobo and Trannoy (2008) then explain why a monopolistic university would combine
admission exams with tuition fees.
Our comparison of unregulated price competition with regulated tuition fees is motivated
by the fact that both systems exist in reality. While price competition both in secondary and
higher education is regulated or eliminated in most European countries, the US are probably
the chief example for price competition among universities. Empirical papers on US data
give strong support for most features of the existing models on competition in tuition fees,
as for instance Epple, Romano, and Sieg (2003, 2006). Competition in secondary education
takes more subtle forms on both sides of the Atlantic but does exist and is largely beneﬁcial
according to several empirical studies such as Hoxby (2000) and Rincke (2006) for the US,
Gibbons et al. (2008) for England and W¨ oßmann (2003) for Europe. Such competition in
secondary education is usually not in price but rather in quality and works through a voucher
system. In a voucher system, the government pays for the education of children via vouchers.
Parents use these vouchers to pay the school they prefer for their child. Hence, in a voucher
system schools must compete for students in order to get public funding, which nicely ﬁts
our model of the regulated market.7
The paper proceeds as follows. We introduce the model in the following section. In
sections 3 and 4 we consider two benchmark cases: First we analyze which curricula and
which allocation of students a social planner would directly implement if he could. Then we
identify the outcome in an unregulated market, i.e. in which schools compete in curricula
7Friedman (1997) makes a strong case for voucher systems in education and receives empirical support
by Sandstr¨ om and Bergstr¨ om (2005) and Gallego (2006).
4and tuition fees. In section 5 we analyze equilibrium when tuition fees are regulated to a
ﬁxed level. We then compare these results and draw ﬁnal conclusions from our analysis.
2. The Model
To keep language simple, we shall refer to all kinds of educational institutions as ‘schools’.
We consider a duopoly market in which schools provide education at zero costs.8 Each
school k decides on the level of tuition fees Tk ≥ 0 and on details of the curriculum which
are summarized in the variable sk such that a higher sk means that the curriculum is more
challenging. A more challenging curriculum increases the productivity eﬀect for students
but makes it harder for them to meet the requirements associated with it. We measure the
curriculum variable in terms of students’ post-graduation income, which allows us to directly
interpret sk as student achievement.
Teaching output spills over into the local economy, an eﬀect we refer to as social teach-
ing spillover and assume to be a fraction  of aggregate student achievement in the city.
Evidence for this externality abounds: For instance, Rosenthal and Strange (2008) show
that the presence of workers with college education is responsible for the positive eﬀect of
agglomeration on wages. Andersson et al. (2009) report large eﬀects of newly established
higher-education institutions on output per worker in the close vicinity of the institution.
We allow for some of this externality to be internalized by schools (private teaching spillover)
and denote this with  ∈ [0;]. At times, we will restrict attention to suﬃciently small  in
order to avoid tedious case distinctions which arise when the private spillover eﬀect becomes
too dominant. To be more speciﬁc, let us denote demand for school k by Dk. Then school
k’s proﬁt is given by
Πk = (Tk + sk)Dk: (1)
Students increase their productivity by studying, which in turn will increase their incomes
after graduation. We assume that their post-graduation income will be higher the more
demanding the school’s curriculum is. On the downside, a more demanding curriculum sk
at school k comes at a cost
s2
k
2 , where  is an ability parameter which is assumed to be
uniformly distributed on [Γ;Γ]. Intuitively, students with higher  incur higher absolute
and marginal costs of preparing the exam of a given curriculum. We normalize the total
mass of students to unity, and we conﬁne the analysis to Γ < 2Γ, i.e. that students are
suﬃciently homogenous, in order to avoid further case distinctions in the analysis. Finally,
tuition fees Tk charged by school k will reduce a student’s utility. Summarizing, a type-
student’s utility from being enrolled at school k is assumed to be




 − Tk: (2)
This utility function has a number of important properties: On the one hand, it has
in common with preferences in models of vertical diﬀerentiation that lower-cost students
8This is just a simplifying assumption; results would be similar with constant marginal costs. See also
the discussion in the concluding section.
5have a higher willingness to pay for any curriculum sk. On the other hand, there is a
horizontal dimension of product diﬀerentiation as, for given prices, every student has a
unique most preferred curriculum which is sk = 1
 and thus strictly decreasing in . Hence,
these preferences exhibit the plausible property that a (high-cost) student may choose a less
productivity-enhancing school even if it charges higher tuition fees.
A consequence of the vertical-diﬀerentiation aspect of preferences is that if a type-
student prefers the school with the tougher curriculum, then all students with cost types
′ <  will do so. Hence, for given tuition fees and curricula, if both schools are able to
attract any demand at all, then there will always be exactly one type of student who is
indiﬀerent between both universities, and one less able type of student who is indiﬀerent
between being enrolled at the laxer school and not being enrolled at all. In this case, these
two types of student therefore fully characterize students’ behavior in the market. Hence, it
will prove convenient to denote the highest-cost type among students enrolled at school k
by k.
With this deﬁnition, and without loss of generality referring to the school with the more
challenging curriculum as school 1 (i.e., s1 > s2), we can now set up schools’ proﬁt functions.
As students diﬀer only in their costs of preparing exams, the average student achievement
of school k is simply sk. Hence, schools’ proﬁts are given by








provided that there are some students who enrol at all at the respective school (i.e., Γ <
1 < 2 ≤ Γ).
By contrast, a benevolent social planner would seek to maximize the sum of students’





























subject to Γ ≤ 1 ≤ 2 ≤ Γ. The ﬁrst summand in the social planner’s objective function
is the total social beneﬁt from aggregate student achievement in both schools, which is just
the sum of students’ aggregate post-graduation income and the social teaching spillover.
The second and third summands are average cost of preparing the exams at each school.
Comparing the objective functions (3), (4) and (5) shows that, irrespectively of the market
structure, there are two potential kinds of externality: First, the already discussed fact that
schools may reﬂect only part of the teaching spillover whenever  < , and second, the fact
that schools care only about their decisions’ inﬂuence on the marginal students, whereas the
social planner cares about the average student.
In line with the theoretical literature on vertical diﬀerentiation, we sought to keep the
model tractable by assuming distributions and functional forms which may seem very special
to the general reader. However, we shall argue in the conclusions that the key eﬀects identiﬁed
6in this paper will hold for a large variety of functional forms. What really drives the main
diﬀerence of our results compared to existing theories, the additional ineﬃciency of regulated
tuition fees identiﬁed in Proposition 4, is what we believe is a distinctive feature of the choice
of curricula: It is the implicit assumption that less able students will prefer laxer curricula
even if tuition fees are constant.
3. Eﬃcient Curricula
As a benchmark, let us analyze how a social planner would locate the two schools on
the range of curricula and allocate the potential students between these schools. Loosely
speaking, the social planner trades oﬀ a higher number of students creating a positive social
surplus when enrolling at a school if the curriculum is lax against a higher social surplus
created by students already enrolled when it is tough.










These equations show that, a higher social teaching spillover () makes society prefer tougher
curricula for a given allocation of students between schools.
Turning to the eﬃcient allocation of students between schools, note that due to students’
heterogeneity it can never be optimal to have only one active school, i.e. Γ < 1 < 2 will be
satisﬁed by the simple ﬁrst-order conditions anyway and can therefore be ignored. Hence,
the only relevant constraint is 2 ≤ Γ. The following Proposition shows that this constraint
is indeed binding:
Proposition 1. The socially optimal sets of students to be enrolled at each school, and































Proof. See the Appendix.
The eﬃcient set of students who should be enrolled at all (which is the entire population
in our model), and the eﬃcient allocation thereof between schools are independent of the
teaching spillover.
74. The Unregulated Market Outcome
If there is no regulation, then schools will choose curricula and tuition fees so as to max-
imize their proﬁts (1). We follow the literature on product diﬀerentiation by assuming that
tuition fees are easier to change on short notice than curricula. We reﬂect this assumption
by modeling the game in a two-stage manner: In the ﬁrst stage, schools choose curricula
simultaneously, and in the second stage they choose tuition fees simultaneously. We solve
the game via backwards induction.
Suppose without loss of generality that school 1 has chosen a tougher curriculum in stage
1, i.e. s1 > s2. Then, due to the monotonicity of students’ preferences with respect to ,
school 1 will attract low-cost students even if it charges higher tuition fees than school 2.
More speciﬁcally, there is exactly one type of student 1 indiﬀerent between both schools,
given by s1 −
s2
1
2 1 − T1 = s2 −
s2
2










Students prefer school 1 over school 2 if and only if their cost type is  ≤ 1.
Furthermore, there may be students who choose not to be enrolled at all. However, we




0, and which will be proven in Proposition 2 to be satisﬁed in equilibrium. Under this
assumption 2 = Γ. Using (12) to substitute for 1 in the schools’ proﬁt functions (3) and
(4), taking their derivatives w.r.t. Ti, solving the resulting system of two equations and
substituting for the equilibrium choices thereby obtained yields schools’ equilibrium proﬁts
in the pricing stage presented in the following Lemma:
Lemma 1. Suppose that in the ﬁrst stage curricula s1 > s2 have been chosen such that in the
equilibrium of the second-stage subgame (i) both schools will charge strictly positive tuition
fees and (ii) even the least able student Γ will strictly prefer being enrolled at school 2 to not





9(s1 + s2)(Γ − Γ)
(



















− (1 + )
)2
: (14)
Proof. See the Appendix.
The area in the s1-s2 space for which (13) and (14) are the schools’ relevant objective
functions in the ﬁrst stage is thus bounded by the following conditions: First, if curricula
are so similar that price competition makes schools charge zero tuition fees and rely solely
on the private teaching spillover, small changes in the curricula will not change equilibrium
tuition fees, so that school’s equilibrium proﬁt functions will be diﬀerent from (13) and (14).
Second, as school 1’s curriculum gets tougher, it becomes less attractive for many of the
8higher-cost students, so that school 2 can aﬀord to charge high tuition fees. This, however
makes school 2 less attractive to the highest-cost types of students. To avoid loosing them,
school 2 will leave its tuition fees constant in some interval of school 1’s curriculum. By
contrast, (13) takes into account an eﬀect of school 1’s curriculum on school 2’s equilibrium
tuition fees. Hence, the objective functions in the Lemma are no longer valid in this area.
With Lemma 1 it is easy to derive equilibrium curricula in the ﬁrst stage of the game
if curricula are restricted to the set in which Lemma 1 is valid. The following proposition
characterizes this equilibrium of the restricted game and derives a suﬃcient condition which
guarantees that the equilibrium of the unrestricted game is equivalent to it.
Proposition 2. Suppose that tuition fees are unregulated and  is suﬃciently low. There is
a constant  ∈ (1;2) which is independent of all other parameters in our model such that























(ii) If Γ ≥ Γ, then equilibrium is at a boundary solution such that the highest-cost student
Γ is just indiﬀerent between being enrolled at school 2 and not being enrolled at all.
(iii) In both cases, both schools’ equilibrium curricula are strictly increasing in . The
tougher school’s equilibrium curriculum is tougher than the eﬃcient one for  suﬃ-
ciently close to , and the laxer school’s curriculum is always laxer than the eﬃcient
one.
(iv) Given the schools’ equilibrium choices of curriculum in part (i), the fraction of students
going to the tough school is ineﬃciently large as long as  is suﬃciently close to .
The same would hold even if curriculum choices were eﬃcient.
Proof. See the Appendix.
If students are rather homogenous, there is not much room for schools to diﬀerentiate their
curricula in order to relax price competition. Hence, all students participate and earn positive
surplus.9 Hence, equilibria in part (i) of Proposition 2 are calculated without incorporating
any eﬀect of curricula on the highest-cost student’s participation decision. As students
9Note that Proposition 2 requires the schools’ private beneﬁt  from teaching spillover to be suﬃciently
low. If it was too dominant, the equilibrium set out in part (i) may be destroyed by the lax schools’ incentives
to move to a curriculum in which the tough school charges zero tuition fees. We chose to analyze only the
former case, as we expect schools’ private beneﬁts to be rather unimportant as compared to the social beneﬁt
of teaching spillover.
9become more heterogenous, this gives schools a fast-growing incentive to diﬀerentiate. For
instance, if it was for the se
1 deﬁned in (15), school 1 would like to choose an inﬁnitely
tough curriculum as Γ approaches 2Γ. However, this is not feasible: As diﬀerentiation
relaxes competition to such an extent that tuition fees are suﬃciently high, the highest-cost
student’s participation constraint binds, which will aﬀect the laxer school’s behavior in the
pricing stage: Its price decision is now restricted by the requirement not to loose the highest-
cost student, so that it does not pay oﬀ any more for the tougher school to further relax
competition by making its curriculum tougher. Hence, for heterogenous students there is a
boundary solution given by the highest-cost student’s participation constraint.
For both the interior and the boundary solutions, equilibrium curricula are increasing in
the schools’ private teaching spillover parameter. Furthermore, absent any teaching spillover
( =  = 0) equilibrium curricula are excessively diﬀerentiated, i.e. the tough school’s
curriculum is excessively tough and the lax school’s excessively lax. This conﬁrms the well-
known result from the IO literature that that ﬁrms tend to diﬀerentiate excessively in order to
relax price competition.10 However, the externality resulting from the teaching spillover has
a countervailing eﬀect on the ineﬃciency of the tough school’s curriculum: As the eﬃcient
curricula are also increasing in , it may be possible for large  and small  that the tough
school’s curriculum is eﬃcient or even insuﬃciently tough. Note that this does not mean
that the externality will have a beneﬁcial eﬀect here, as the lax school’s curriculum will be
even more ineﬃcient in such a case.
Part (iv) of Proposition 2 shows that even if we take schools’ choices of curricula as given,
a social planner would order less students to go to the tough school than what actually
happens in equilibrium. Hence, the pricing stage introduces another ineﬃciency. Note that
even if the condition that  be close to  is not satisﬁed, in which case the ineﬃciency of
equilibrium allocation of students may go in either direction, it is clear that this allocation
can be eﬃcient only by a mere ﬂuke.
Summing up, we have two sources for ineﬃciency in the unregulated market: First, it is
only the private instead of the social beneﬁt of teaching spillover which enters the schools’
objective functions. Second, the market suﬀers from the well-known ineﬃciencies, excessive
diﬀerentiation and oligopoly pricing.
5. Fixed Tuition Fees
Assume now that tuition fees students must pay at both schools are regulated to T ≥
0. Then the individual beneﬁt of product diﬀerentiation for schools that it reduces price
competition no longer holds, as prices are given anyway. To see this, recall equation (12),
which describes the allocation of students among the two schools, provided that both schools
can attract some student. As the diﬀerence in schools’ tuition fees is zero, this allocation
depends only on the schools’ curricula. More speciﬁcally, a type- student prefers school
1 over school 2 if and only if his most preferred curriculum 1
 is tougher than the schools’
10See, for instance, Shaked and Sutton (1982).
10average curriculum. The following Lemma shows that without the motive of relaxing price
competition, schools do not have any incentive to diﬀerentiate their curricula.
Lemma 2. There cannot exist a pure strategy equilibrium in which schools set diﬀerent
curricula.
Proof. See the Appendix.
In the proof of Lemma 2 we show that in any situation in which schools oﬀer diﬀerent
curricula, at least one school will have an incentive to move its curriculum closer to the
rival school. For instance, if all students strictly prefer being enrolled in some school to
not studying at all, the laxer school can always increase its proﬁt by oﬀering a slightly
tougher curriculum: The lax school’s externalities from student achievement increase for
every student enrolled at the lax school, and the lax school’s student body increases as the
average curriculum gets tougher.
Lemma 2 established that if a pure strategy equilibrium exists, then both schools must
choose the same curriculum in equilibrium. To assess whether such an equilibrium exists and
characterize it, assume now that there exists such a symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium.
Let s∗ denote the equilibrium choice of curriculum for each university, which can be the
case only if it is not proﬁtable for a school to undercut or overbid s∗. Recall that s∗ is
the most preferred curriculum of type ∗ := 1
s. Hence, unilaterally slightly undercutting
(overbidding) s∗ would give school i all students enrolled with cost parameters below (above)
∗ instead of half the total demand. As its teaching spillover remains almost unchanged after
such a slight deviation, a slightly deviating school cares only about total demand. Hence,
such a marginal deviation is unproﬁtable if and only if there are exactly half of all enrolled
students below and above ∗, respectively. The following Proposition derives the unique
curriculum satisfying this requirement:11
Proposition 3. If tuition fees are exogenously ﬁxed at T, there is a unique pure-strategy
equilibrium with both schools oﬀering identical curricula s∗
i = s∗












whenever T < 1







Proof. See the Appendix.
A striking implication of proposition 3 is that the teaching spillover does not inﬂuence
the schools’ decisions on curricula at all. Instead, schools’ behavior is equivalent to demand
maximization: For a slight deviation from the rival’s curriculum, the change in teaching
11Of course, the proof must, and does, include also an analysis of large deviations from s.
11spillover is marginal, whereas demand is discontinuous at this point for almost all curricula
the rival may set.
If T ≤
2 
( + )2, all students prefer being enrolled at a university oﬀering curriculum s∗ =
2
 +  to not being enrolled (’full market coverage’), so that type ∗ = 1
s is obviously the
median student. For
2 
( + )2 < T < 1
2 , the highest-cost type Γ is better oﬀ not being enrolled
if the curriculum 2
 +  is oﬀered. Hence, the equilibrium in this case is the curriculum which




the type indiﬀerent between being enrolled and not being enrolled is  = 2
s −Γ, so that the
median among all enrolled students is indeed ∗ = 1
s. Furthermore, in this case, higher ﬁxed
tuition fees make, for given curricula, schools less attractive for the highest-cost students,
thus increasing average ability. Hence, the equilibrium curriculum, which lies in the center
of the enrolled students’ most preferred curricula, gets tougher. It follows that both the
median student’s (∗ = 1
s) and the marginal student’s ( = 2
s − Γ) cost types decline as
the regulated tuition fee increases.12
Proposition 3 shows that the level of the ﬁxed tuition fee T plays an important role in
determining the equilibrium. Every T induces a unique equilibrium curriculum given by
equation (17) and thus a unique set of participating students. This means that, from a
welfare point of view, the regulator’s choice of T in fact boils down to choosing a pair of












relationship of T and the equilibrium choices, it will be interesting to ﬁnd the best tuition
fee a regulator can set, given that he chooses to regulate tuition fees at all. There are
two obvious ineﬃciencies associated with ﬁxed tuition fees: First, equilibrium curricula is
always symmetric, whereas the students’ heterogeneity calls for some product diﬀerentiation.
Second, there is only one regulatory instrument, the ﬁxed level of tuition fees T, which is
supposed to regulate two equilibrium outcomes at the same time, the choice of curriculum
and the set of enrolled students.
In order to separate these eﬀects, let us ﬁrst derive the socially optimal curriculum and



















which maximizes the regulator’s objective function for given . The following Lemma shows
that the regulator’s optimal choice of the set of enrolled students is a boundary solution:
12Of course, an equilibrium cannot exist if T ≥ 1
2 , as even the lowest-cost student’s ( = Γ) net surplus
from education can get as large as that.
12Lemma 3. If the regulator could force schools to choose a certain curriculum s and students
to enrol or not, with the only restriction being that schools’ curricula are homogenous, the
socially optimal curriculum is s =
2(1+)
 +  , and all students should be enrolled independently
of .
Proof. See the Appendix.
As one would expect, a higher social teaching spillover calls for tougher curricula. Fur-
thermore, Lemma 3 illustrates the aforementioned problem associated with controlling two
equilibrium choices with just one regulative instrument: Inducing full participation of stu-
dents in equilibrium is associated with the curriculum s = 2
 + , which is ineﬃciently lax. On
the other hand, if the social planner induces schools to set up the eﬃcient curriculum (given
an homogenous equilibrium), students’ participation will be ineﬃciently low.
This inevitable ineﬃciency is surprising at ﬁrst glance, as one might conjecture that the
optimal regulation is trivially T = 0, which seems to align private and social costs and
beneﬁts. To see this, suppose that  =  = 0. A social planner would then seek to maximize
just the sum of student achievement less students’ expected eﬀort costs. To achieve this,
he must (i) order schools to choose the ’central’ curriculum, which minimizes the average
distance from the enrolled students’ most preferred curricula, and (ii) make sure that the
marginal student’s productivity is equal to his eﬀort cost under this curriculum. As we know
from Proposition 3, the equilibrium curriculum will, for every T, always be that curriculum
which is most preferred by the median enrolled student. Hence, the social planner need care
only about balancing the marginal student’s productivity and eﬀort cost, which is clearly
achieved if and only if T = 0. This reasoning is, however, no longer valid if  > 0. Even if
the entire social teaching spillover was internalized by schools ( = ), the teaching spillover
works, in fact, like an externality, as schools are forced by the mechanics of equilibrium to
ignore it when choosing their curricula. Hence, simply setting the non-distorting tuition fee
T = 0 will not align individual and social interests in this case.
Given this trade-oﬀ between inducing schools to oﬀer a tougher curriculum in order to
account for the teaching spillover, and losing some students that should be educated, a
natural question is how a social planner should balance these ineﬃciencies. The following
Proposition establishes that the ‘participation eﬀect’ strictly outweighs the ‘teaching spillover
eﬀect’ whenever  > 0, so that the optimal regulation yields full student participation:
Proposition 4. (i) The (second-best) optimal regulation of tuition fees induces schools to
choose the curriculum s∗ = 2
 + , under which all students will be enrolled in equilibrium.
(ii) Curricula are always too lax under the second-best regulation.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Proposition 4 implies that the optimal regulation will induce schools to choose ineﬃ-
ciently lax curricula whenever  > 0. Hence, the anecdotal concern that all universities may
excessively reduce the requirements for a degree in order to please low-ability students is
13conﬁrmed, but in our model this incentive arises in the regulated case, whereas in the public
discussion this problem is often attributed to an unregulated market.
Even more strikingly, the equilibrium curriculum oﬀered by both schools under the opti-
mal regulation does not depend at all on the teaching spillover, neither on the social nor on
schools’ private one. Hence, the regulator’s attempt to inﬂuence schools’ choices of curricu-
lum via regulated tuition fees comes at two kinds of cost: Any diﬀerentiation of curricula
is removed, and so is any incentive for schools to take the teaching spillover into account.
Whether the beneﬁts of regulation exceed the cost depend on the extent of market imper-
fection in the unregulated case. This will be discussed in more detail in the next section.
6. Comparison
The analysis in sections 4 and 5 suggests that a comparison between the two regimes
will depend on three model parameters: First, the social teaching spillover  determines
how the equilibrium outcomes in the two regimes are valuated in the social welfare account.
As the teaching spillover is deﬁned to relate only to student achievement, larger  will
make that regime comparatively more attractive which results in higher average student
achievement. This is good news for the practical application of our theory, as it implies that
the more severe externality problem is, the more important for the regulation decision is
average student achievement, which is much easier to measure than students’ average cost
of preparing exams.
Second, schools’ private teaching spillover  determines the extent of ineﬃciency in the
unregulated market, but does not aﬀect equilibrium at all if tuition fees are regulated. Hence,
larger  will make the unregulated market comparatively more attractive.
Last, the degree of heterogeneity of students’ types plays an ambiguous role: If students
are homogenous, then the lack of diﬀerentiation of curricula under regulated tuition fees is
less harmful, but at the same time the problem of excessive diﬀerentiation in the unregulated
market is less pronounced. Which one of the two eﬀects dominates will crucially depend on
the details of the distribution of students’ types and is therefore an empirical issue.
The impact of teaching spillover can be nicely illustrated in the following numerical
example, for which equilibrium outcomes happen to be easy to calculate.
Example 1. Let Γ = 3
2Γ. As 3
2 < , equilibrium curricula in the unregulated market are
given by the interior solution (15) and (16). Hence, se
1 =
4(1+)
3  , and 1 = 7
6Γ. With (5),
this yields social welfare in the unregulated market,
W
u = (1 + )(1 + )
8
9Γ




Under the optimal regulation of tuition fees, s = 4






We can thus easily analyze the impact of the teaching spillover:
14• Absent any teaching spillover ( =  = 0) regulated tuition fees would yield a higher
welfare than an unregulated market.
• However, a positive social spillover  > 0 reduces this advantage even if it is not
internalized at all ( = 0), as average student achievement in the unregulated market,
8
9 , is larger than that under regulated tuition fees (which is equal to s = 4
5 ).
• This eﬀect is even stronger if the private teaching spillover is varied together with the
social teaching spillover (for instance, if  is a ﬁxed fraction of ).
7. Conclusions and Discussions
We have investigated the eﬀects of regulating competition between providers of higher
and secondary education and found that it is regulated tuition fees which induce universities
to set up excessively lax curricula. This is in sharp contrast to the standard argument
discussed in the public, who attribute this ineﬃciency to an unregulated market. This
ineﬃciency is increasing in the size of the positive externality of student achievement for
the local economy. Furthermore, even if some of this externality can be appropriated by
schools, it will not inﬂuence equilibrium. On the other hand, the unregulated market features
equilibrium curricula which are excessively diﬀerentiated and increasingly tough in schools’
private beneﬁts from teaching spillover.
Our analysis of the regulated case rests on the assumption that schools choose curricula
autonomously because close teacher supervision in the classroom is almost impossible. If
curricula were able to be regulated directly, ineﬃciencies would not arise because schools
would then simply be ordered to oﬀer eﬃcient curricula. Of course regulators would like to try
to get a grip on the content in particular in the context of regulated tuition fees when curricula
are too lax and too uniform. Germany’s higher education sector provides an interesting
example in this context. Tuition fees are low and very regulated and policy makers are
busy ensuring minimum standards for curricula via a tough accreditation process for degree
programs. Moreover, tertiary education is separated between more academic institutions
(research universities) and applied institutions (universities of applied sciences). The latter
universities must hire professors with suﬃcient business or other practical experiences to
make sure that teaching does not become too academic. This eﬀort may be interpreted as
the regulator’s attempt to impose a larger separation in curricula between these diﬀerent
types of universities.
The aim of our analysis was to examine in which regulatory environment the suspected
incentive to be excessively lax on study requirements is more pronounced. In doing so, we
focused almost exclusively on the choice of curriculum and disregarded other arguments
which are often brought forward in defense of regulation, such as capital market imperfec-
tions. Hence, we had to be careful when interpreting our comparison of the two regimes.
In particular, we are well aware that our comparing discussions in Section 6 do not prove
that the unregulated market was always superior, for instance, for a suﬃciently large private
beneﬁts to schools from teaching spillover ( in our model). We rather see this comparison
15as an example which shows that the countervailing eﬀect of regulation we have identiﬁed
may be suﬃciently severe as to make up for certain positive eﬀects of regulation.
At the same time, we believe that our basic insight that the ineﬃciency associated with
regulated tuition fees is more severe for a higher social teaching spillover is rather robust:
The result that the ineﬃciency of equilibrium curricula under the optimal regulation is
increasing in  is a direct consequence of schools’ behavior of demand maximization, which
in turn follows from the plausible assumption that weak students prefer easy ways of getting
a degree for given tuition fees. In the case of the unregulated market, equilibrium curricula
do respond to changes in schools’ private beneﬁts of teaching spillover and, if these private
beneﬁts are somehow linked to social beneﬁts, also to changes in social beneﬁt of teaching
spillover. Hence, although our assumptions may seem special, all we need for our results
are curricula as characteristics of schools, together with well-known and robust features of
models of vertical product diﬀerentiation.
Having said this, we note that it is possible to extend our model in multiple ways in order
to achieve comparability to results of previous studies. In the following we shall discuss brieﬂy
the consequences for our results of some of these extensions.
Costly teaching. If teaching is costly, both society and schools prefer some of the highest-cost
students not to study any more. Hence, in the regulated case the optimal regulation will
entail a positive ﬁxed tuition fee. We considered a similar model where teaching entails a
ﬁxed cost C per student, but it turned out that the ranking of the unregulated market and
the optimal regulation remained unaﬀected for  = 0, and so did the comparative statics
with respect to . The intuitive reason is that schools’ and society’s interests are aligned
concerning the eﬀects of tuition costs.
Heterogeneous schools. In reality, diﬀerences in the teaching spillover exist not only between
institutions which are active on diﬀerent market, such as secondary and higher education,
but also within markets. Hence, the natural question arises how our results would change in
a model where schools have heterogeneous k and k. It turns out that equilibrium curricula
under regulated tuition fees are still homogenous (Proposition 3), which follows directly from
the fact that schools’ best replies are independent of k. Hence, what changes is just that
the social preference for diﬀerentiation increases, which makes regulated tuition fees even
less attractive.
Distribution of students’ types. The uniform distribution of types seems rather strong, but
our qualitative results are robust to moderate deviations from this assumption. We ana-
lyzed the model with diﬀerent assumptions on the distribution of types, and as long as the
distribution of types is suﬃciently smooth, the optimal deviation from the competitor’s cur-
riculum in the regulated case is still the minimum deviation. Hence, in this case, the result
that under regulated tuition fees the equilibrium curriculum is where exactly half of the
enrolled students would prefer a tougher and half of them would prefer a laxer curriculum
goes through. If, however, the density function of types exhibits steep peaks, it may be the
case that attracting the group of students represented by such a peak dominates all other
16eﬀects. In this case, an equilibrium with heterogeneous curricula might result even in the
case of regulated tuition fees.
Fixed heterogenous tuition fees. In our model, ﬁxed tuition fees are associated with large
ineﬃciencies because they lead to a symmetric equilibrium in curricula. One could, therefore,
conjecture that heterogeneous ﬁxed fees may improve things. Indeed, in Kemnitz (2007) such
a regulation even implements the ﬁrst best if these ﬁxed tuition fees are set optimally. In our
model, however, the horizontal-diﬀerentiation character of the students’ preferences induces
the ”cheaper” school to steal its rival’s students whenever the demand for the expensive
school is positive. Intuitively, the high-fee school will attract zero demand whenever its
curriculum is too similar to that of the low-fee school. However, if the high-fee school seeks
to escape this by setting a very demanding or a very lax curriculum, the low-fee school’s best
reply to this is again to move closer to the high-fee school, thereby driving the demand for
the high-fee school again down to zero. Hence, there is a pure strategy equilibrium only if
the low-fee school can keep the high-fee school out of the market for any choice of curriculum
of the high-fee school. Otherwise, the equilibrium will be in mixed strategies, which makes
it impossible to implement a given set of curricula with certainty.
Vouchers. We have assumed for simplicity that schools receive exactly the tuition fees their
students pay. In the public discussion it is sometimes suggested that skilled graduates pay
higher taxes to the government, and per-student compensations for educational institutions
should be independent from those taxes. Note that such an assumption would not make any
diﬀerence in our model, as schools maximize demand in equilibrium and do not care about
the exact size of per-student revenue at all.
Peer-group eﬀects. Unlike many contributions our paper does not consider peer eﬀects be-
tween students which are prominent in Kemnitz (2007), Epple et al. (2006), Lazear (2001)
and empirical papers like Hoxby (2000). Peer eﬀects are a type of network eﬀects and imply
the impact of a student on his fellow students. In theoretical models, they usually are cap-
tured by the average ability of students in a school (like in Epple et al. (2006) or Kemnitz
(2007)). In this case it is typically eﬃcient to enrol students into diﬀerent schools according
to their ability. Note that Meier (2004) provides an exception to this rule of thumb. Full
competition between schools typically achieves this selection. On the other hand Hoxby
(2000) argues that good students provide support in particular for bad students such that
competition leads to allocations which are beneﬁcial for the good students but harmful for
the overall welfare. Econometric problems are a key cause for this heterogeneity, as the self-
selection of students into peer groups typically precludes the estimation of counterfactual
evidence.13 Furthermore teachers and other factors may shape the peer eﬀects. Hence it is
not surprising that Epple et al. (2006) refer to all types of empirical evidence for peer eﬀects.
Our main results do not change qualitatively if we model peer eﬀects indirectly by means
of a positive impact of the students’ average cost type on a school’s proﬁt (as for instance in
13See Eisenkopf (2010).
17Kemnitz (2007)). In this case, under regulated tuition fees schools will reﬂect the beneﬁcial
eﬀect of stricter curricula on average student type and thus on their proﬁts, so that equilib-
rium curricula will be stricter than in the absence of peer-group eﬀects, and less students will
enrol. The results that there are only symmetric equilibria, that equilibrium curricula are
independent of the teaching spillover and therefore the ineﬃciency associated with regulated
tuition fees is increasing in this spillover will, however, continue to hold.
Appendix
Appendix A. Proof of Proposition 1













−  = 0 (A.2)
(2 − Γ) = 0 (A.3)
 ≥ 0: (A.4)







which proves that the constraint is binding, i.e. 2 = Γ.
Hence, the socially eﬃcient curricula and allocations of students can be obtained by
solving the system of equations (6), (7) and (A.1) when substituting for 2 = Γ. Using (6)
and (7) to substitute for s1 and s2 in (A.1) yields
1 =
(1 + Γ)(1 + Γ)
21 + Γ + Γ
;
which is equivalent to (8). Using this to substitute for 1 in (6) and (7) then yields the
eﬃcient curricula (10) and (11). 
Appendix B. Proof of Lemma 1
Every student may choose among three options: Being enrolled at school 1, at school 2,
and not being enrolled at all. Note ﬁrst that students’ types diﬀer only in how they valuate
curricula, and not tuition fees. Hence, for any combination of tuition fees, if there are some
types who prefer the tough school 1 and some who prefer the lax school 2, then there will be
exactly one type 1 given by equation (12) such that a student prefers school 1 over school
182 if and only if  < 1. Similarly, if there is some type which prefers school 2 and some who










such that a student prefers school 2 over not being enrolled if and only if  < 2. In that
case, 1 < 2.
Suppose for the moment that both schools attract a strictly positive number of students,
which will turn out to be the case in equilibrium. Then, for any given pair of curricula
s1 > s2 chosen in the ﬁrst stage, the schools’ proﬁts are















































Taking the derivative of Π1 w.r.t. T1, and recalling that negative tuition fees are ruled











































As the numerators in both parts of (B.5) are linear and decreasing in T2, they each would
have, absent the restriction of their domain, a unique root. To get the global proﬁt maximum,
note ﬁrst that there is a kink in Π2 at the border of the domains, with Π2 being steeper
































where the second summand is positive at the boundary of the two domains, as the ﬁrst part
of (B.5) exists only if s2 < 2
 .
19An immediate implication of this result is that the ﬁrst-order condition
@2
@T2 = 0 can









@T2 , in which case the ﬁrst-order condition is sat-
isﬁed in neither case, and the maximum is then at the border between both cases. Combining
these cases yields the best-reply curve for school 2:
T2 =

     
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In the ﬁrst case of (B.6), the best-reply curve is given by the ﬁrst-order condition
@2
@T2 =





@T2 < 0. Similarly, the best-reply curve in the third case of (B.6) solves
@2





@T2 > 0. The domain of the second case of (B.6) is then simply the set of T2
between the domains of the ﬁrst and the third case, and the best-reply curve in the second
case is given by the requirement that T2 is exactly on the border between both cases of (B.5).
Note that school 2’s best-reply curve is continuous in T1.
The slope of school 2’s best-reply curve in a T1-T2 diagram is never larger than 1
2, whereas
the slope of school 1’s best-reply curve is 2. Hence, there is a unique equilibrium at the inter-


























− (1 + )
)
− s2 (B.8)
provided that both of these tuition fees are nonnegative. This equilibrium satisﬁes the
deﬁnition of the ﬁrst case of (B.6) if and only if
s1
(


















1 +  − s1(2Γ − Γ)
2(1 + ) − s2(Γ + Γ)
(B.10)
It can be shown that for 0 < s2 < s1 this boundary has the shape of an inverted C.
20Using (B.7) and (B.8) to substitute for T1 and T2 in (B.2) and (B.3) then yields (13) and
(14).
We brieﬂy mention the other cases of (B.6) as we will need them in the proof of Propo-

























provided that both are nonnegative, which is the case for T ∗
1 if and only if
s1
(









(Γ − Γ) ≥ 0: (B.13)
This equilibrium satisﬁes the deﬁnition of the ﬁrst case of (B.6) if and only if the reverse of














(Γ − Γ) ≥ 0: (B.14)
If (B.14) does not hold, school 2’s equilibrium tuition fees in the third case of (B.6) apply,
but we will not analyze this case in detail as we will show in the proof of Proposition 2 that
it is irrelevant for our analysis. 
Appendix C. Proof of Proposition 2
We start by proving the characterization of the interior equilibrium given in part (i) and
the boundary equilibrium given in part (ii) of the Proposition along with the proof of the
comparative statics given in part (iii). Then, we will prove that it is not proﬁtable for any
school to deviate to a curriculum outside the set which governs Lemma 1. Last, we will
prove part (iv) of the Proposition.
Appendix C.1. Characterization of the Interior Solution
The partial derivatives of equilibrium proﬁts in the pricing stage (13) and (14) with







1 +  −
s1+s2
2 (2Γ − Γ)
)
9(s1 + s2)2(Γ − Γ)
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2 (2Γ − Γ) − (1 + )
)
9(s1 + s2)2(Γ − Γ)
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(2Γ − Γ) (C.3)
21and







(2Γ − Γ): (C.4)
both of which always exist because Γ > Γ. Note that the right-hand side of the former
condition is always larger than the right-hand side of the latter condition, and both right-
hand sides are monotonically increasing in s2. Hence, sa
2 < sb
2. Furthermore, this implies that
in a small neighborhood below sb
2, both the numerator of the fraction on the right-hand side
of (C.2) and the large bracket in (C.2) are positive, proving that there is a local maximum at
sb
2. One can show by a similar argument that there is a local minimum at sa
2. Furthermore,
sa
2 is the lower boundary of the laxer school’s feasible set, because curricula below this would
lead to negative demand and negative equilibrium ’gross price’ T2 + s2. Hence, the global
maximum is at sb
2 which satisﬁes the latter ﬁrst-order condition (C.4).
For the tougher school’s proﬁt, interior local extremal points exist if and only if Γ < 2Γ,
an assumption we made in Section 2. Then, the argument is very similar to that for the
laxer school: There are two extremal points at sa
1 and sb
1 deﬁned by




(2Γ − Γ) (C.5)
and







(2Γ − Γ); (C.6)
with sa
1 > sb
1. Again, both the numerator and the term in large brackets on the right-hand
side of (C.1) are positive for s1 < sb
1 slightly below sb
1, which proves that there is a local
maximum at sb
1. Furthermore, there is a local minimum at sa
1, which is the upper bound of
the tougher school’s feasible set. Hence, the global maximum is at sb
1 given by (C.6).
Substituting for s1 = sb
1 in (C.4) and for s2 = sb






   






and, substituting in (C.4) and (C.6), equilibrium curriculum choices (15) and (16).
Let us now compare equilibrium curricula se
1;se
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√


















which would be equal to s
f
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√





(Γ − Γ)2 + 2(Γ − Γ)
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ΓΓ − 2(Γ − Γ)2 − (Γ − Γ)
);





if and only if 4ΓΓ > 9(Γ − Γ)2, which is satisﬁed if and only if
Γ < 1:92495 · Γ. It will be shown in Subsection Appendix C.2 that this is always the case if
the equilibrium is the interior solution.
Appendix C.2. Characterization of the Boundary Solution




2Γ − Γ (C.8)
G :=
√















GG(G+G) . Then, applying








































































[GGΓ − 3(Γ − Γ)
2] ≥ 0;
which is satisﬁed if and only if Γ ≤ 1:566210 · Γ.
Consider now the case where se
1 and se
2 are outside the ﬁrst case of (B.6). Recall from
(B.10) that the boundary between the ﬁrst and the second case of (B.6) has the shape of


















Last, both schools’ best-reply curves given by (C.6) and (C.4) are strictly upward sloping




2 are outside the ﬁrst case of (B.6), both schools’ best-reply curves intersect
this boundary where it is upward sloping in the s1-s2 diagram, and the candidate equilibrium
in the boundary case is given by the intersection of (C.4) and the equality version of (B.9).
For comparative statics and comparisons with ﬁrst-best curricula, we need a better char-


















We can get comparative statics by taking the total diﬀerential of B(s2) on the left-hand
















2Γ + 2s2(1 + )(2Γ − Γ)(4Γ + Γ) − 2(1 + )
2(7Γ − 2Γ)
= −s2(1 + )(2Γ − Γ)(4Γ + Γ) + 4(1 + )
2(7Γ − 2Γ) − 24
(1 + )3
s2
24where the second equality uses B(s2) = 0 to substitute for 3
2s2
2(2Γ − Γ)2Γ. This rearranged
expression is strictly increasing in s2 whenever s2 <
2(1+)
 +  , which we can use as an upper










2(2Γ − Γ)(4Γ + Γ) − 4s2(1 + )(7Γ − 2Γ) + 24(1 + )
2;
which is decreasing in s2 whenever s2 <
2(1+)





2 < 0. Hence,
ds2
d > 0.
In the s1-s2 diagram, It is easy to check that an increase in  will move school 2’s best-
reply curve to the left and the boundary of the ﬁrst case of (B.6) to the right. Furthermore,
both curves are positively sloped, and school 2’s best-reply curve is the ﬂatter of both curves.
Hence, the intersection of these curves will move to the right, which proves that
ds1
d > 0.
Let us now compare the boundary solution to the ﬁrst-best curricula. Suppose ﬁrst that
























which is negative whenever Γ is so large that the equilibrium is the boundary solution.
Hence, school 2’s curriculum in the boundary solution is below s
f
2 if  = . As
ds2
d > 0, this
holds for all 0 ≤  ≤ .
Appendix C.3. Deviations to Other Cases
We will now prove that for suﬃciently low  it is not possible for a school to proﬁtably
deviate to some curriculum outside the area in which proﬁts are given by (13) and (14).
To begin with, it is important to note that the (piecewise) proﬁt functions are continuous
everywhere. Furthermore, if se
1 and se
2 are in the ﬁrst case of (B.6), then the resulting equi-
librium tuition fees are strictly positive for suﬃciently low : Using the notations introduced


















for which both right-hand sides have a strictly positive ﬁrst summand even for  = 0, so that
it is always possible to ﬁnd some positive, but very small  such that tuition fees are strictly
positive. Furthermore, together with continuity of the proﬁt functions and the fact that
their derivatives are always ﬁnite as long as s1 > s2, this implies that it is always possible
to ﬁnd some positive and very small  such that school k’s maximum proﬁt with Ti = 0 for
some i and for given curriculum of the rival school s−k = se
−k is smaller than its proﬁt under
curricula se
1;se
2. Hence, we can rule out deviations to zero tuition fees within the ﬁrst case
of (B.6). It remains to show that schools will not deviate to other cases in (B.6).
25School 1 deviates. Let us start with school 1. Note ﬁrst that school 1 can never deviate from
the candidate equilibrium to the third case in (B.6), which is deﬁned by the complementary







2 , the left-hand side of (B.14) is
positive for all s1. Hence, for every s2 ∈ (0;s1), there exists a s′
1(s2) such that (s1;s2) is in
the ﬁrst case of (B.6) if and only if s1 ≤ s′
1(s2), and in the second case otherwise. Now, we
ﬁx school 2’s curriculum at se
2. The following Lemma shows that if (se
1;se
2) are in the ﬁrst
case of (B.6), then school 1 cannot increase proﬁt by unilaterally deviating to the second
case of (B.6).
Lemma 4. In the second case of (B.6) with positive tuition fees, school 1’s proﬁt is strictly
decreasing in s1 for every s2.
Proof. This case is deﬁned by the intersection of the sets of (s1;s2) satisfying s2 ≥ 0, the






















































The denominator is always positive, and the ﬁrst term in solid brackets in the numerator is
positive as long as demand is positive. In the s1-s2 diagram the roots to this ﬁrst solid bracket
are on an inverted-U-shaped curve which intersects the 45-degree line at s1 = s2 =
2(1−)
 
and which is downward sloping for s1 > s2 > 0. The second case of (B.6) with positive
tuition fees is a subset of (B.13), which is deﬁned by s1
(







2 (Γ − Γ) ≥ 0, the
left-hand side of which is equal to the ﬁrst term in solid brackets in (C.12) less 2s1, which
proves that the ﬁrst term in solid brackets in (C.12) is always positive in the second case of
(B.6) with positive tuition fees.








, which is positive if and only if s1 <
2(1+)
  . The roots to this term are
located on a curve which intersects the 45-degree line in the s1-s2 diagram at s1 =
2(1+)
 
and is strictly increasing for s1 >
2(1+)
  : This curve on which the roots of the second term






s1(Γ + Γ) − 2(1 + )
;
14Recall that (B.14) is always satisﬁed for school 2’s equilibrium curriculum.





1Γ(s1(Γ + Γ) − 3(1 + )
(s1(Γ + Γ) − 2(1 + ))s2
;
which is positive for every s1 >
2(1+)
  . Hence, the right-hand side of (C.12) is negative for all
s2 <
2(1+)
  and therefore throughout the second case of (B.6) with positive tuition fees.
School 2 deviates to the second case with T1 > 0. Let us now turn to school 2. Assume
for the moment that school 1 will choose positive tuition fees in the pricing stage. Recall
from (B.10) that in the s1-s2 diagram, the boundary between the ﬁrst and the second case
of (B.6) has the shape of an inverted C: The curve has a maximum s1 at s2 =
2(1+)
 +  and is
downward (upward) sloping for larger (smaller) s2.
For any given pair of curricula s1;s2 which belongs to one of the ﬁrst two cases of (B.6),















































The candidate equilibria are always located in the ﬁrst case of (B.6) and clearly maximize
schools’ proﬁts within this case. Outside this case, deviations to the second case of (B.6)
may be possible with larger and smaller s2, due to the inverted-C shape of the boundary
between the ﬁrst and the second case of (B.6) in the s1-s2 diagram. That is to say, for given
s1 the set of s2 satisfying the ﬁrst case of (B.6) may have an upper boundary and a lower
boundary at the same time. Let us ﬁrst compare on both sides of such a boundary. As the




@s2 as s2 approaches the upper (lower) boundary of the ﬁrst case is non-positive
(non-negative).




@T2 = 0 in the ﬁrst case of (B.6) with
T ∗














@T1 are independent of whether we are in the ﬁrst




@T1 > 0, the limit of
@
2(s2;s1)
@s2 as s2 approaches
the boundary in the ﬁrst case is larger than the limit as s2 approaches the boundary in
the second case if and only if
dT
1










The former is larger than the latter if and only if s2 >
2(1+)
 +  , which is exactly where the




always larger if s2 approaches the boundary from below than if it approaches it from above.
This proves that a deviation to the second case close to the boundary is never proﬁtable.
To complete the proof that a deviation to any s2 in the second case is unattractive, we
only have to rule out a local minimum in the second case. To this end, let us substitute for
T ∗
1 and T ∗



























































, which is positive if and only if s1 >
2(1+)
2 −  ,
which is in turn the minimum s1 on the boundary between the ﬁrst and the second case for
s1 > s2 ≥ 0. Furthermore, the ﬁrst summand on the right-hand side of (C.15) is strictly




@s2 between s2 = 0 and the lower boundary of the ﬁrst case of (B.6).
On the other hand, if s2 approaches s1, the denominator in the second summand on the




2(1 + ) − s2Γ
)
, which is negative for s2 close to s1 whenever s1 >
2(1+)
  ,
which is the intersection of the boundary with the main diagonal in the s1-s2 diagram.
Hence, as the other factors in this summand are all positive when s2 is slightly below s1 and
s1 >
2(1+)




@s2 is negative in the second case of (B.6) as s2 approaches s1. As both
summands are again monotonic, it also follows that this derivative is negative for all s2
between the boundary between the cases and the main diagonal.
School 2 deviates to the second case with T1 = 0. For the case of T1 = 0, school 2’s proﬁt



















2(1 + ) − s2





Hence, school 2’s best-reply curve is given by
s
2
1(s2Γ − (1 + )) = s
2
2(1 + ): (C.16)
In the s1-s2 diagram, this curve intersects the main diagonal at s1 = s2 =
2(1+)
  with
inﬁnitely negative slope, and is convex and negatively sloped for s1 >
2(1+)
  . Suppose now
28 = 0. Then, school 2’s best-reply curve, the boundary between the ﬁrst and the second
cases of (B.6) and the curve above which T1 ≥ 0 is binding all intersect at s1 = s2 = 2
  and
are negatively sloped. Furthermore, if  = 0 then for all s1 > s2 the boundary between the
ﬁrst and the second cases of (B.6) is below the curve above which T1 ≥ 0 is binding. As the
slope of school 2’s best-reply curve is inﬁnitely negative at s1 = s2, it is the lowest of the
three curves for curricula close to the intersection of the three curves. Hence, it is suﬃcient
to show that at s2 = 2
 +  the pair of curricula on school 2’s best-reply curve induces school 1
to charge positive tuition fees, i.e. is still located to the left of the curve above which T1 ≥ 0




 , so that there is no curriculum in the second case of (B.6) with T1 = 0 which school
2 could possibly deviate to.
Applying s2 = 2




(Γ − Γ)(Γ + Γ)
so that the left-hand side of (B.13) is
2Γ
2
− 3ΓΓ + 3Γ
2 − 2(Γ + Γ)
√
(Γ − Γ)(Γ + Γ)
(Γ + Γ)2(Γ − Γ)
;
which is negative (at least) for all 3
2Γ ≤ Γ ≤ 2Γ. Hence, we have shown that this region
is unattractive for school 2 for  = 0, and because of continuity we can conclude that this
holds also for positive, but suﬃciently small .
Appendix C.4. Proof of Part (iv)
Using (B.7) and (B.8) to substitute for T1 and T2 in (12) yields the type of student that








which is larger than the socially optimal allocation of students to schools for given curricula
s1 and s2,
2(1+)
s1+s2 , if and only if






For s1 = se
1 and s2 = se










and for s1 = s
f












both of which are satisﬁed for suﬃciently small  − . 
29Appendix D. Proof of Lemma 2
We prove that for any pair of curricula s1 > s2:
• if all students have an incentive to enrol, then the less challenging school can increase
proﬁt by making its curriculum tougher (Step 1),
• and if at least the highest-cost student chooses not to enrol, then the more challenging
school can increase proﬁt by making its curriculum softer (Step 2),
and conclude that such a pair of diﬀerent curricula cannot be an equilibrium.
Step 1: Suppose that all students choose to enrol, which is the case if s2 − Γ
s2
2
2 − T ≥ 0.
As the maximum net utility of the highest-cost student is 1
2 , a necessary condition for full
market coverage is T ≤ 1
2 . On the other hand, if this condition is satisﬁed, then it is always
possible to ﬁnd some s2 ≥ 1
  such that full market coverage is warranted.
Given that all students enrol, the less challenging school attracts all students between
1 = 2













If s2 ≤ 2
  − s1, Π2 is identical to zero. For s2 > 2
  − s1, which exists in the case considered
in this step whenever s1 > 1













Hence, if s1 > 1
 , the lax school can increase its proﬁt by moving closer to the tough school’s
curriculum.
Finally, if s1 ≤ 1
 , s1 is preferred to every s2 < s1 by every student. Hence, the lax school
earns zero proﬁt in such a situation, whereas switching to a curriculum slightly tougher than
s1 would yield the (formerly) laxer school the whole market and thus strictly positive proﬁt.
Step 2: Suppose now that the highest-cost student Γ chooses not to enrol, which is the
case if and only if s2 −Γ
s2
2
2 −T < 0. As we have restricted attention to non-negative tuition












The more challenging school attracts all students who prefer its curriculum (i) to the lax
school’s curriculum ( < 2











































(s1 + s2)2 − Γ
)
: (D.2)
Suppose ﬁrst that s2 ≤ 2















2 − (1 − )





















where the ﬁrst line uses the lower bound for T, the second line the deﬁnition s1 > s2, the
third line the supposition that s2 ≤ 2
 , and the forth line Γ < 2Γ.
Suppose now that s2 > 2



















































































s1+s2, which in turn is smaller than 1=2 due to s1 > s2, and the forth line uses
s1 ≥ 1
 , which must be the case in order to avoid the other school to locate itself slightly
above s1 and attract the entire market. 
31Appendix E. Proof of Proposition 3
The equilibrium curriculum s∗ speciﬁed in the proposition is the unique curriculum sat-
isfying the requirement that it is the most preferred one by the median among all enrolled
students. Hence, a situation with both schools choosing some curriculum s ̸= s∗ cannot be
an equilibrium: If s < s∗, it would be proﬁtable to deviate to a curriculum slightly above s,
as this would give the deviating school the same research spillover as before, but more than
half of the total demand. The same argument holds for s > s∗. Furthermore, recall from
Lemma 2 that there cannot be any heterogenous equilibria. Hence, we have proven that if
there is a pure strategy equilibrium, it must be that speciﬁed in the Proposition.
To prove that this s∗ is indeed an equilibrium, it is suﬃcient to show that no deviation
can be more proﬁtable than the marginal deviation, i.e. than choosing a curriculum slightly
above or below s∗. Hence, the proof will be organized in the following way: In the ﬁrst step,
we show that the best deviation to above is the marginal one. In the second step, we show
that the the best deviation to below is the marginal one under certain conditions (steps 2a
and 2b), and that these conditions are satisﬁed in our candidate equilibrium (step 2c).
Step 1: Deviation to above. If a school deviates to some s1 > s∗ and her rival sticks to









(T + s1); (E.1)









(s1 + s2)2 − Γ
)
; (E.2)









































2 and s2 < 1
 .
32a contradiction to s1 being a deviation to above. Note that we used T ≥ 0 for the second,
s2 = s∗ ≥ 2
 +  for the third, and Γ < 2Γ for the forth inequality.
Step 2a: Deviation to below; full market coverage. If a school deviates to below, i.e., chooses
































(Γ − Γ)(s1 + s2)2 > 0:
With Π2 = (T + s2)D2, this implies
@Π2
@s2




Step 2b: Deviation to below; incomplete market coverage. Under incomplete market coverage,
the deviating (i.e., lax) school’s proﬁt is













































































As we will argue in the next substep, it is suﬃcient to prove the following Lemma:













































is constructed such that it implies
that
@2
@s2 ≥ 0 if s2 is suﬃciently close to s1. This can be seen by substituting for s2 = s1 and
solving for T.
Hence, it remains to show that
@2
@s2 ≥ 0 for all s2 < s1. We will do so by proving that
@22
@s2





































































































For the ﬁrst inequality we used the condition that
@2
































for all  > 0.
Step 2c: Deviation to below; summary. A more detailed way of writing the s∗ given in (17)














Note that s2 = s∗ satisﬁes the condition (E.3) of full market coverage if and only if T ≤
2 
( + )2.
Hence, it remains to show that the pairs of (T;s∗) with T >
2 
( + )2 satisfy the condition of










. Using s∗ ≥ 2
















for all  > 0. 
Appendix F. Proof of Lemma 3
Note ﬁrst that the lower restriction  ≥ Γ cannot bind, as yields zero value of the objective
function and it is easy to ﬁnd pairs of s and  ∈ [Γ;Γ] for which the objective function is
strictly positive. Hence, the only relevant constraint is  ≤ Γ.
34The Kuhn-Tucker conditions of the regulator’s problem are (19),
s
(




−  = 0 (F.1)
( − Γ) = 0 (F.2)
 ≥ 0 (F.3)
Using (19) to substitute for s in (F.1) yields
 =
2(1 + )2Γ
(Γ − Γ)( + Γ)2 > 0;
which proves that the constraint  ≤ Γ is binding. 
Appendix G. Proof of Proposition 4
Recall that the regulator’s problem of choosing T is equivalent to choosing a pair (s∗;)
such that  = 2
s − Γ. Using this to substitute for  in (18) yields the regulator’s objective
function
(1 + 2)(1 − s∗Γ)
Γ − Γ
; (G.1)






, the claim follows immedi-
ately. 
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